James Hird was appointed senior coach of Essendon Football Club in September 2010.

Hird was on his own branch of the Essendon organisation structure and reported directly to Chief Executive Officer, Ian Robson. 

Hird had four assistant coaches reporting to him – Mark Thompson, Brendan McCartney, Simon Goodwin and Sean Wellman.

Incomprehensibly, in what was probably, a world first, the Essendon football department was on a different branch of the organisation structure from Hird’s coaching branch. The football department was run by Paul Hamilton, whose title was General Manager – Football Operations.

Unbelievably, Hird had neither a direct nor broken line link to Hamilton.

Hird’s coaching department only had a broken line link to Hamilton’s football department through high-performance managers Stuart Cormack and his replacement Dean Robinson and people and development manager Danny Corcoran.

Hamilton, like Hird, reported directly to CEO, Ian Robson.

Essendon’s executive team included:

• Essendon FC Board; (Level1)
  
  
• Managing Director & CEO, Ian Robson; (Level 2)
  
  
• Chief Financial Officer; Chief Commercial Officer; General Manager – Football Operations, Paul Hamilton; Chief Operating Officer; and Communications Manager. (Level 3).
  

Although Hird reported directly to the chief executive, Ian Robson, he, unlike those named above, was not a member of the executive. The high-performance unit was run by Stuart Cormack until June 2011, and then by his replacement, Dean Robinson, from August 2011 until February 2013. 

The high-performance unit formed part of the football department and Cormack and then Robinson, reportedly directly to Hamilton. 

It is impossible to determine James Hird’s legal responsibilities without understanding matrix organisations and the Essendon organisation structure. The following is my creation from having designed many matrix organisations for clients. 

Unfortunately, despite numerous pleas to the media, no journalist was prepared to mention matrix organisation or publish the Essendon organisation structure that I sent them. They weren’t interested, clearly, because they couldn’t hold Hird responsible if they had published it.

Unbelievably, neither ASADA nor Ziggy Switkowski referred to the Essendon organisation chart – decisions which made their reports worthless in terms of individual responsibilities.

Matrix organisation structures have been embraced by organisations since the late twentieth century to leverage and recognise the professional credentials and expertise of an increasingly specialised workforce. This ensures that elite subject matter experts have the authority and responsibility commensurate with their professional credentials and are not politically buried deep within archaic ‘command and control’ structures.

In addition, professional experts are held to account to the standards and ethics of their own profession that CANNOT be eroded or ignored by the commercial or other organisational hierarchy. Doctors, lawyers, accountants and human resource specialists, etcetera, are all sworn to codes of conduct that is core and conditional to their accreditation. Thus, no one could legally override Dr Reid on medical matters at Essendon, and no one, including Demetriou, Fitzpatrick, McLachlan, could override general counsel Andrew Dillon on legal matters at the AFL.

The Essendon board and executive were at least implicitly aware of this when they created an organisation that accorded solid line reporting by specialists to their accountable manager whilst with persons and departments which they ‘served and advised’ having dotted line reporting relationships.

Solid line accountability and reporting represent authority and responsibility with rights to:

• Set policies and procedures to ensure proper compliance with standards their professions demand
  

• Provide the formal Quality Assurance for the provision of their professional expertise
  

• Hire and fire, performance manage and therefore promote and remunerate staff within their department
  

This meant that Hird only had authority over, and responsibility for, Mark Thompson, Brendan McCartney, Simon Goodwin and Sean Wellman. 

Dotted line accountability denotes consultation, advice and provision of expert services. This meant that Hird could consult with, and seek advice from, Dean Robinson and Danny Corcoran. He had no power to admonish, let alone discipline Robinson or Corcoran or anyone in any department other than his own coaching department.  

Every organisation is subject to legal and regulatory framework that is general to all organisations. In addition, there are legal and regulatory requirements and enforcement agencies particular to specific industries such as professional sport. 

The board is obliged to ensure the chief executive establishes an organisation, policies and procedures that comply with all legal and regulatory requirements. The appropriate professional is delegated responsibility and authority for designing and enforcing rules and processes to ensure compliance. 

At Essendon, the line of authority for the supplementation programme was Robson, Hamilton and Robinson, with the proviso that Dr Reid could not be overruled.

No executive in a line role, as is the football and coaching departments, is expected, or indeed allowed, to establish policies, introduce procedures or intervene or ignore the application of any such rules and regulations. 

In large corporations, there are Board Risk Sub-Committees that are established to ensure a direct line to the board if any staff considers there are breaches of proper practices. For example, this occurred in the David Jones-Mark McInnes matter. 

In any public company, the chief executive himself could not act in direct contradiction to a formal opinion by a lawyer or accountant that spoke of non-compliance.

To illustrate the increasing obligations of major organisations, in the last few years, significantly upgraded OH&S compliance obligations have been imposed on company directors, which include criminal and civil penalties for offences. 

The board and chief executive are obliged to ensure all laws and regulations are enforced and the onus is on them to prove that they were in place and that ALL relevant and affected staff, those impacted as well as those with authority and responsibility is apprised of their respective rights, duties and obligations. 

In May 2011, President David Evans; CEO Ian Robson; General Manager – Football Operations Paul Hamilton; Football Manager Danny Corcoran; Senior Coach James Hird; and Assistant Coach Mark Thompson, agreed that Essendon had to adopt a more scientific approach to conditioning, nutrition and recovery – a strategy, no doubt, embraced by every club in the league. 

Unsurprisingly, the AFL also shared the view that there were some positives to be derived from sports science and the search for the extra edge. On 24 April 2012, the AFL’s General Manager – Football Operations, Adrian Anderson, sent an email to the clubs titled ‘Leading Approach to Sports Medicine and Sports Science in AFL’. 

The discussion paper that was attached to the email, identified a range of issues and possible consequences that had arisen under the existing medical arrangements within AFL clubs. Inter alia, Anderson said: ‘The influence of sport science and search for the extra “edge” has grown in recent years which has some positive and potential negative implications.’

Ian Robson (page 59 of the interim report) said: “It was clear, we all felt – all of us felt, coming out of 2011, that the – the players were undersized in terms of their strength.”

Paul Hamilton (page 59 of interim report) said: “The coaches had identified – I don’t think they were happy with the weights programme that had been previously done by the previous regime. Certainly – and Mark Thompson was a big one on this – he wanted – he wanted the players to lift heavier weights… In combination with this focus, Essendon, decided to invest more in the high-performance sports science team.” 

The bottom line was the coaches and senior executives, including the president and chief executive (who spoke for the board), had identified a problem. It was the football department’s, led by Paul Hamilton, responsibility, to fix the problem. 

Identifying the problem and insisting that the football department complied with the WADA Code; that Dr Reid had the final say; that the players were free to decide the extent of their involvement, if any; and that no supplement could be harmful to a player, was the beginning and end of Hird and Thompson’s official input – although Hamilton invited Hird and Thompson to Robinson’s and Dank’s interview meetings. 

Despite what Caroline Wilson wrote every other day, Hird and Thompson had no responsibilities whatsoever for the high-performance unit or the supplementation programme and had no authority to intervene.

The Victorian Occupational, Health & Safety Act, the Commonwealth Corporations Act, various agreements signed by the AFL and Essendon, the Essendon matrix organisation structure, and job responsibilities, determined responsibility for providing a safe workplace. 

ASADA and the media had no say, although the media’s vicious, unrelenting attacks claiming Hird was responsible, created a false opportunity for AFL general counsel, Andrew Dillon, to lodge a series of vexatious allegations against Hird and Thompson.

In early June 2011, a member of Hird’s cycling ‘group’ asked Hird whether AFL clubs used peptypes (sic) [peptides] as part of their conditioning program. Hird had never heard the word before andapproached the club’s performance dietician and recovery co-ordinator, Benita Lalor and asked her what she thought of ‘peptypes’. Lalor immediately advised Essendon’s high-performance manager, Stuart Cormack that she had been approached by Hird and asked about peptides.

On 16 June 2011, Stuart Cormack resigned as Essendon’s high-performance coach, which created an opportunity for Essendon to change focus within the high-performance unit by employing someone with better sports scientist credentials to run the high-performance unit under Hamilton’s control.

On 26 July 2011,Hird approached an ASADA Doping Control Officer (DCO) during a routine drug testing session at Essendon and asked whether any AFL clubs were using ‘peptites’[sic] as he had received information that they were. Hird’s approach was reported by the DCO to his superiors at ASADA.

Within a couple of days of Hird’s conversation with the ASADA doping control officer, AFL integrity manager, Brett Clothier, phoned Essendon’s General Manager – Football Operations, Paul Hamilton and requested that he bring Hird to a meeting at the AFL. The phone call was significant in that it clearly demonstrated that the AFL knew Hamilton was more senior to Hird.

On 5 August 2011 (page 56 of interim report), Hird was interviewed by ASADA and AFL integrity officers in relation to his enquiry with the DCO. Essendon’s two most senior football department members, Hamilton and Danny Corcoran, also attended the meeting. Hird explained that he had been approached by some colleagues from his cycling group who had asked him about ‘peptites’ [sic] and whether they were permitted to be used.

ASADA’s interim report inexcusably stated that “At the conclusion of the ASADA interview, The AFL’s Manager Integrity Services ‘re-iterated’ to Hird that peptides were a serious risk to the integrity of the AFL, in the same category as steroids and HGH.’ 

Brett Clothier told Hird that ‘peptides already appeared to be infiltrating other elite sports in Australia and that [the AFL] we could be next.’ Clothier also ‘implored Hird to report to [the AFL] if he came across any information relating to peptides.”

This account is substantially different from the accounts of Hamilton, Corcoran, Hird and the ASADA official Paul Roland who attended the meeting. ASADA’s inexplicable decision to accept Clothier’s claim as fact, not only proved ASADA’s bias but corrupted the entire investigation to the point that the investigation should have been aborted. 

Throughout the interim report, testimony by witnesses is preceded by terms such as “says” or “claims”. On this occasion a witnesses’ comment was accepted as fact. 

The above Clothier comments were used against Hird by AFL general counsel Andrew Dillon and given Hird had no responsibilities within the football department, undoubtedly contributed more to the AFL demanding he be suspended for twelve months than any other factor. This begs the question: Why did ASADA accept Clothier’s comments as fact when Hird, Hamilton, Corcoran and ASADA’s Roland believed the comments were pure fabrication: 

• The AFL’s Manager Integrity Services ‘re-iterated’ to Hird, implies Hird was told before. That statement is incorrect.
  

• Clothier was an investigator. He had access to all witnesses’ testimonies. Allowing him to provide testimony resulted in ASADA diminishing the strength of the investigation;
  

• Hird initially testified on 16 April 2013, and inter alia, discussed what was said at the 5 August 2011 meeting. Hird’s account differs significantly from what ASADA investigators accepted as fact in their interim report.
  

• Clothier, ‘coincidentally’, testified the very next day, 17 April 2013. Because Clothier’s comments on 17 April 2013 regarding the 5 August 2011 meeting were not mentioned in the interim report, it is likely ASADA did not ask him about it or he could not remember the details.
  

• At 12:33pm on 17 July 2013, Clothier sent an alleged witness statement email to ASADA investigators. Although, ASADA has not published the full contents of the email and file notes, it claims the above comments by Clothier were part of it. 
  

• Given the damage the email caused Hird and given the flood of irrelevant SMSs and emails between Dank and non-Essendon people included in the report, it is inexplicable that this email was not included in full, in the report.
  

• ASADA has not clearly explained why it considers the email as evidence;
  

• Several lawyers raised concerns about Clothier’s involvement as both investigator and witness. ASADA was criticised for not re-interviewing him about the email, as his statement differed from staff accounts of the August 5, 2011 meeting.
  

• Many witnesses were recalled for clarification or rebuttal, yet Hird was not questioned further about this issue. Given, Hird believes Clothier fabricated his evidence, Hird should have been given an opportunity to refute Clothier’s claim.
  

• Danny Corcoran and Paul Hamilton, whose contemporaneous notes taken at the meeting disagreed with Clothier’s claim, should have been recalled by ASADA to be questioned about the matter.
  

• ASADA employee Paul Roland attended the meeting with Clothier, Hamilton, Hird and Corcoran and his recollection is different from Clothier’s, which ASADA accepted as fact. On page 56 of the interim report it states: “According to the ASADA file note of Paul Roland ‘Mr Hird stated that he had never heard of the substance before and the opportunity arose to ask ASADA testing staff on the day of the mission on his club on 26.7.11. Mr Hird reiterated that he had no knowledge of the substance whatsoever and was simply making inquiries to satisfy the original question put to him. A general discussion then followed covering off on ASADA’s belief that various forms of peptides were increasingly being detected by Customs and other agencies and that the products were banned in sport.’ (ASADA file note – xxxxxxxxxxxx).
  

• Clothier did not record the above comments in his diary. Those comments were never mentioned to anybody until he trotted them out 713 days later. In an unprecedented display of foresight, the Age’s Caroline Wilson discussed the content of Clothier’s email in her on-line at column at 3:00am, which was nine hours before Clothier sent the email (12:33pm) to ASADA. The leak was obviously in breach of the ASADA Act and appears to have been done to damage Hird.
  

• If ASADA had genuinely been interested in the truth instead of focussing on compiling a case against Hird, it would have asked Clothier a series of questions:
  

• Why did Clothier mistakenly say peptides are like steroids and HGH, which are both banned? Many peptides are not banned. Clothier’s alleged comment for Essendon not to use any peptides put Essendon at a severe disadvantage because other clubs were using permitted peptides.
  

• As Hamilton was General Manager – Football Operations, and as he was a member of the Essendon executive, and as he was responsible for the high-performance unit, why did Clothier warn Hird instead of Hamilton?
  

• If Clothier really gave Hird the above warning, why didn’t he inform AFL’s General Manager – Football Operations, Adrian Anderson, in writing about the warning, as he was required to do?
  

• If Clothier really gave Hird the above warning, why didn’t he inform Essendon chief executive, Ian Robson, in writing about the warning as he was required to do?
  

• As Clothier was responsible for the integrity of the competition, and as the warning contained serious concerns by him, why didn’t he conduct a series of audits at Essendon to ensure it was complying with his demands?
  

• If Clothier gave the above warning to Hird, is there any difference between him trusting Hird to comply, and Hamilton / Hird warning Robinson and Dank not to breach the WADA code, and then trusting them to comply? 
  

• If Hird is penalised for trusting Hamilton’s Essendon staff, should you receive the same penalty as Hird, for trusting Hird to comply with your request?   
  

Dean Robinson started work as Essendon’s high-performance coach on 25 August 2011.  Robinson reported to General Manager – Football Operations, Paul Hamilton. The doctors; sports scientist (Stephen Dank); physiotherapists; physical prep manager; rehab coach; physical prep coach; performance dietician and recovery co-ordinator; trainers; pilates instructor; and the masseurs all reported to Robinson. 

In his interview with ASADA on 15 February 2013, chief executive, Ian Robson, stated (page 99 of interim report) that “Mr Robinson had supervisory responsibility of the sports science team, which included Mr Dank and the club doctors. In turn, Mr Robinson reported to Mr Hamilton who was accountable to both Mr Robson and the club’s executive. Mr Dank was part of the sports science team and therefore reported to Mr Robinson.”

Inexplicably, ASADA, of its own volition stated on page 62 (interim report) that: “Robinson in turn reported to Hird and Hamilton”. In making this claim ASADA was guilty of serious misconduct. This claim was factually incorrect. ASADA knew it was incorrect. ASADA had no evidence to support the claim. This was further grounds to have the investigation aborted. This statement was the major contributor to Hird being asked to stand aside for 12 months. 

Hird (page 62 of interim report) rejected any suggestion that he had instructed or encouraged Robinson to ‘push the edge’. 

Hird: “I have an issue with people who give people illegal products and things that would harm them. My philosophy is as stated there, that any product that goes to a player must not harm them, must be approved by the AFL and WADA and the player has to consent to it, and the doctors [have] the ultimate say, but – that was expressed to Dean all the time.”

According to Robinson (page 62), his role encompassed both managing the high-performance department and overseeing medical staff, including doctors and physiotherapists. He emphasised that this oversight did not interfere with or undermine their independent professional medical decision-making.

On 28 September 2011, at Dean Robinson’s request, Stephen Dank was interviewed for the role of sports scientist at Essendon Football Club. The interview panel comprised General Manager – Football Operations, Paul Hamilton; football manager, Danny Corcoran; high- performance coach, Dean Robinson; senior coach, James Hird; and assistant coach, Mark Thompson. 

As it transpires, the AFL owned Gold Coast Suns and Essendon breached the WADA Code when they hired Dank. The code includes words to the effect that if a person uses a substance banned for athletes on a member of the public, he cannot work with an athlete who falls under the WADA umbrella. In simple terms, it was illegal for the Gold Coast Suns and Essendon to hire Dank. The AFL was equally at fault for registering Dank.

ASADA devoted over 6000 words in the interim report to the recruitment process of Robinson and Dank. ASADA was concerned that “no background checks were (sic) conducted with Dank’s past employers”. Notwithstanding this was a lie, what Essendon’s recruitment policy had to do with ASADA’s charter of investigating possible anti-doping violations is beyond comprehension. 

ASADA investigating Essendon’s recruitment procedures is bordering on a criminal abuse of taxpayers’ money. This is just one of many unacceptable examples of ASADA acting outside its charter to build a case for the AFL to charge Essendon, Hird and Thompson for “governance failures”.

As Dank had worked for Manly Rugby League Club for seven years, and as Robinson had worked for Thompson at Geelong for three years, and as both had worked together for the AFL at the Gold Coast Suns, Hamilton believed they had credible credentials. 

Hamilton believed that if it were good enough for the AFL to employ Dank and Robinson, it was good enough for Essendon to do likewise. ASADA did not submit the AFL’s background checks on Dank and Robinson when hiring them.  

ASADA (page 73) disagreed with Hamilton about doing an acceptable back-ground check and in the most self-humiliating statement of the year, believed Essendon should have ‘Googled’ Dank. 

Inexplicably, ASADA tried to build a case against Thompson and Hird over the recruitment of Dank and Robinson. To his lasting shame, AFL general counsel Andrew Dillon, in his first charge-sheet, even charged Hird and Thompson for allegedly not checking Dank’s and Robinson’s references. Such action by Dillon was unconscionable considering neither Hird nor Thompson was a member of the football department – the department responsible for employing Robinson and Dank.

Pre-season training commencedon 19 October 2011. Hird took overseas holidays between 20 October 2011 and 7 November 2011. As part of the pre-season training, players were administered supplements that had not been approved by club doctors Bruce Reid and Brendan De Morton. None of the three substances taken, Tribulus, Creatine and Glutamine was on the WADA prohibited list. 

Dr Reid recalled on day one of the [2012] pre-season [that] he ‘blew his stack’ after discovering Robinson had approved Tribulus (taken in tablet form) to be handed to some players at training. 

Dr Reid told ASADA that he contacted AFL medical chief Dr Peter Harcourt that same afternoon to ensure the supplement wasn’t a WADA prohibited substance. 

Reid’s phone call to Harcourt should have triggered an immediate response from the AFL because a doctor being marginalised posed a potential threat to the integrity of the competition and the health of the players. 

Dr Harcourt should have informed the AFL’s integrity officer Brett Clothier of the possible breach. Clothier should have investigated Essendon immediately. Furthermore, Clothier should have reported the matter to ASADA. Clause 4.6 of the AFL’s anti-doping code says: “Where reasonable and as soon as the AFL becomes aware that a possible Anti-Doping Rule Violation may have occurred, the AFL will immediately advise ASADA of the possible violation. The AFL will provide ASADA with all information pertaining to the possible Anti-Doping Rule Violation.” Had the AFL acted on 19 October 2011, the subsequent events could have been avoided.

In addition to speaking to Dr Harcourt, Dr Reid also approached Robinson to reinforce the protocol that ‘nothing without [his] knowledge’.

Dr Reid did not raise his concerns with Hird on Hird’s return from holidays three weeks later. This was not unusual because Hird was not a member of the football department, and as such, Reid’s concerns were outside Hird’s area of responsibility or authority to do anything. As Reid was concerned about the actions of his immediate boss, his duty was to report the matter to Robinson’s boss, Paul Hamilton. 

Robinson stated (page 81) that although “it was part of his charter with Essendon ‘to push the edge’, he understood that this was to occur within WADC guidelines”. 

Essendon (pages 21-22) attended a pre-season camp at the Sheraton Mirage on the Gold Coast between 11 – 16 December 2011. Biochemist, Shane Charter and his family attended the same venue at the invitation of Dank 

According to Shane Charter, Hird told Dank that anything used on the Essendon players had to be WADA compliant and approved by Dr Reid. 

Essendon broke for the Christmas period from 22 December 2011 till 8 January 2012. 

Sometime between the players return from the Christmas break on 8 January 2012 and 13 January 2012, Dr Reid became aware that players were being administered Tribulus (oral) and allegedly AOD-9604 (injection) without his approval. He spoke to Hird and then shortly afterwards to his department head, Paul Hamilton. 

Dr Reid spoke with Hamilton about the supplementation programme and advised Hamilton that he would be writing a letter outlining his concerns. Hamilton doesn’t recall ever receiving a copy of Dr Reid’s letter.

February 2012: Robinson (page 28) recalled discussing the supplementation programme with Robson and being advised, ‘I’m happy for you to push the edge’. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

On 24 April 2012, the AFL’s General Manager – Football Operations, Adrian Anderson sent an email to Ian Robson titled ‘Leading Approach to Sports Medicine and Sports Science in AFL’. The discussion paper that was attached to the email, identified a range of issues and possible consequences that had arisen under the existing medical arrangements within AFL clubs. 

• Influence of sport science and search for the extra “edge” has grown in recent years which has some positive and potential negative implications
  

• Recent AFLMOA survey of club doctors (14 clubs responded):
  

• 7/14 said non-medically qualified personnel had exerted undue influence on medical decision making on one or more occasions in the previous 12 months
  
• 6/14 said this had adversely affected medical decisions on one or more occasions
  

• 5/14 said this had decreased satisfaction with their role
  

• Shortage of suitably qualified Medical Officers (MO) wishing to work in clubs and some current club MOs are close to retirement
  

• Multiple cases of AFL doctors leaving clubs
  

• Non-evidence based medical practices are growing which presents potential medical and injury risk ie, IV vitamins/supplements, specialist referrals without doctor input, radiation exposure and unhygienic facilities. Possible consequences were potential risk to player welfare (emergency cover, mistreatment, etc; exposes club, club staff & coaches, and AFL to potential litigation; issue with MO recruitment and retention; and potential MO insurance issues
  

On 24 April 2012, Mr Robson forwarded Mr Anderson’s email (including attachment) to Mr Corcoran and Mr Hamilton. Although it is not required, this is further proof that Hamilton and Corcoran were responsible for the high-performance unit and the supplementation programme, and not Hird or Thompson. 

In late July 2012, Dr Reid, supported by Corcoran and Hird asked David Evans and Ian Robson to terminate Dean Robinson’s services. Evans and Robson refused on the grounds the club couldn’t afford the payout. Dr Reid’s request was discussed at the August board meeting. The board supported Evans and Robson’s decision.

In July/August 2012, Essendon conducted an internal review into soft tissue injuries. Hamilton (page 36) delivered the findings. Under the heading of ‘STOP’ were the following entries: [Stop] going for magic cures – Supplementation that is not medically based. Concerns with Tribulus, and Creatine. IV injections. According to David Evans, the review was headed by Ian Robson. This was irrefutable proof that Robson was untruthful when he told the ASADA investigators that he was unaware of a supplementation programme at Essendon.

Robson (pages 102-103) had also expressed concern regarding Dank’s financial practices advising in an email to Hamilton and Corcoran dated 21 August 2012 that: ‘I am aware of three outstanding accounts incurred by Steve Dank and/or Dean Robinson. One account involved HyperMED which was owed $61,000 for hyperbaric treatment and injections. The second involved a bill from Skinovate for $10,000 for vitamin injections. The third was from Away Australia for $18,961 for two supplements.

Hamilton (page 24) recalled a conversation with Robinson the day after his meeting with Dr Reid in which he (Hamilton) forcefully reminded Robinson that ‘you’re in charge. It’s your staff. You need to make sure that all the guidelines are being kept’.

The protocols required Dank to provide Dr Reid with all available information concerning the supplement including scientific name, clinical findings, side-effects; Dank to provide a statement [to Dr Reid] that the supplement is not contravening any WADA guidelines; Dr Reid to then make A FORMAL RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE SUITABILITY OF THE PLAYERS USING THE SUPPLEMENT TO Hird, Robinson and Dank; Following a determination that a supplement would be used a player would be required to sign an ‘informed consent’ form prior to the first administration of the supplement.

On 8 February 2012, players attended a meeting in the EFC Auditorium. The meeting was addressed by Dank and Robinson and related to the new supplement protocols: AOD-9604; Thymosin; Colostrum; and Tribulus

Despite having put in place, supposedly foolproof protocols, within two days of the first complaint, the system broke down within days, if not hours. To assign responsibility, and to decide whether charges should have been laid, two questions needed to be answered:

1. Who was responsible for ensuring Essendon players were not administered WADA prohibited substances? 
   
   – The players, whose contracts stipulated that they had the ultimate responsibility for what they were administered
   
   – The AFL Players Association, which was supposed to educate the players, and obviously failed to do so.
   
   – Dr Reid and Dr De Morton, who had to approve every substance given to the players
   
   – Dean Robinson, who Dank reported to.
   
   – Paul Hamilton, who Robinson reported to
   
   – Ian Robson, who Hamilton reported
   
   – The Board, who the Victorian Occupational, Health and Safety Act, assigned ultimate responsibility.
   
   – The AFL, which failed to fulfil its contractual obligations to do everything in in its power to ensure Essendon provided a safe workplace.
   
   – The AFL’s medical Director, Dr Peter Harcourt, who failed to report that Dr Reid had been marginalised on 19 October 20111.
   
   – Andrew Demetriou, who chose to ignore that he knew doctors were being marginalised. Demetriou breached rule 4.6 of the AFL Anti-Doping Code by not reporting his concerns to ASADA in early 2012.
   
   – Brett Clothier, who was responsible for maintaining the integrity of the competition. On 5 August 2011, he participated in a general discussion with Hamilton, Corcoran, and Hird.
   
   
2. Did Dank violate the protocols, and if he did, was there any way someone could have stopped him? There is no doubt that despite his efforts to fulfil his responsibilities, Dank did his own thing at times.
   
   
3. In summary, although ASADA tried in vain to build a case against Hird, there were only four allegations
   
   i. Hird tried to push the edge, push the boundaries. With respect to this allegation, it was just a repetitive comment. Obviously, no attempt was made to create a case because it was an impossible task.
   
   ii. WADA classifies substances as either prohibited or permitted. There is no “close to the edge” or “pushing the boundaries” categories. It’s like when you are driving a car in a 60kph zone. If you are driving at 59kph you are driving within the law. If you are driving at 61kph you are breaking the law. 
   
   iii. In further defence of Hird’s position, the Australia Sports Commission boasts on its website that it has a cutting-edge supplementation program which enhances performance. If it’s good enough for the Sports Commission, it should be good enough for Essendon.
   
   iv. Dean Robinson stated he always followed Essendon’s directive not to violate WADA rules.   

In his report, Ziggy Switkowski said: “Following concerns about the program in January (2012), the Senior Coach [James Hird] reasserted the principles about the supplement program that: any supplement must be WADA and ASADA compliant; it must not be harmful to players health; players must be properly informed about anything entering their bodies, and every product was to be cleared by the doctor.” 

On 28 August 2013, AFL deputy chief executive, Gillon McLachlan, said: “James [Hird] did never set out to implement a program that could have involved performance enhancing drugs or injurious drugs.” Furthermore, the AFL acknowledged in the Deed of Settlement that “Hird did not set out to implement a supplements programme that would result in players being administered WADA prohibited substances”.

Hird was portrayed by the AFL, ASADA and the media and the viperous Caroline Wilson as being the person at Essendon most responsible for the supplementation programme. 

A layman could be forgiven for thinking he was initially responsible because at the media conference on 5 February 2013, Hird said he would accept full responsibility. Unfortunately for Hird, the media reinforced this untrue message for months. 

The AFL, ASADA and the media were deceitful in pushing this line because they all knew the Victorian Occupational Health & Safety Act and the Essendon organisation structure and job responsibilities determined who was most responsible. Just as a mother can’t accept responsibility for a murder committed by a son, the law didn’t allow Hird to accept responsibility. 

The circumstances of Hird accepting “full responsibility” deserve repeating. Media consultant Elizabeth Lukin was hired by Essendon CEO, Ian Robson, to advise Essendon how to handle the matter. 

Just prior to the media conference on 5 February 2013, Lukin, Evans and McLachlan insisted / persuaded / bullied Hird into taking “full responsibility”. This was incredibly bad advice for Hird, but great for the Essendon Board and the AFL because it absolved them off any responsibility. 

The statement was factually incorrect, as the AFL Commission and Essendon Board hold primary responsibility, and Hird was not part of the football department that oversaw the high-performance unit according to the organisation structure.  

Hird was alleged to have failed to heed a warning from AFL integrity manager, Brett Clothier, not to use peptides. Hird claims Clothier’s evidence was fabricated and points to the notes taken by the ASADA representative Paul Roland as proof of his claim. Hird further argues that ASADA acted negligently by failing to seek Paul Hamilton’s and Danny Corcoran’s perspectives on the meeting.  He claims their contemporaneous notes support his position. 

Hird shared general OH&S duties with staff but, not being in the football department, had no specific responsibility or authority over the supplementation programme.   

The AFL and ASADA were dishonest in alleging he was responsible for the saga. Consequently, he should never have been forced to stand aside for 12 months.   

The fact that Hird was senior coach of the club is irrelevant. The programme was the responsibility of the Essendon football department, which was led by Paul Hamilton. Hird was head of the coaching team which was on a different branch of the organisation structure. Hird’s job description didn’t involve any responsibilities for the programme. Hird had no authority to intervene in football department matters. 

Clause 7.3 of the Standard Playing Contract states that “The AFL Club shall provide a playing, training and working environment which is, so far as is practicable, free of any risk to health, safety and the welfare of the player. Without limitation, the AFL Club shall carry out its obligations under the applicable Occupational, Health and Safety Act or its equivalent”. ‘Practicable’ is a key component of this clause. 

Clause 12 ‘Best Endeavours’ of the Standard Playing Contract states that “The parties to this contract shall use their best endeavours in relation to any matter or thing directly within their control, to bring about compliance with all the provisions of this contract.